RECEIVERS AND LEASES SUBORDINATE
TO THE MORTGAGE
SHELION T2XT*

QUESTION which must frequently arise in the foreclosure of
mortgages (including trust deeds) of real property is the effect of
the appointment of a receiver upon leases which are subordinate
to the mortgage. This question is important not only to the tenants and
the receiver, but also to the mortgagee, the mortgagor, junior lienholders
and assignees of the equity of redemption. Though the courts have been
flooded with receivership cases, a search of the reports discloses comparatively few cases in which the problem has been considered. The object of
this essay is an examination of foreclosure receiverships to determine the
effect of a receivership upon leases of the mortgagor which are subordinate
to the mortgage which is being foreclosed.
NATURE OF FORECLOSURE RECEIVERSHIP

A foreclosure receivership is an institution of the court of chancery designed to preserve the mortgagee's securityin order that it will be available
when the suit is ended.' Just as the court of chancery will protect the
mortgagee by enjoining acts endangering his margin of security so, pending the foreclosure suit, it will assume custody of the property when its
assistance is needed to prevent irreparable injury, and will delegate an
officer of the court to do those things proper to insure that the property
pledged as security will be available when the decree has been obtained.
The court undertakes this formidable task only because its aid is essential
to prevent threatened irreparable injury to the mortgagee. It is not undertaken simply because the mortgagee has a right to possession or a contract for a receiver pending foreclosure.2 Unless the mortgagee can show
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
'2 Daniell, Chancery Pleading and Practice (6 Am. ed. 1894),* 17is ef seq. especially § 1716
note (b); 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (3d ed. i919), § 1330; Clark, Receivers (2d ed.
1929), § 24; High, Receivers (3 d ed. 1894), § 1; 3 Jones, Mortgages (8th. ed. 1928), § 1930;

Wyatt Practical Register (ioo), § 355. For a typical judicial statement see Chicago Title and
Trust Co. v. Mack, 347 Ill. 480, 483, i8o N.E. 412, 413 (1932).
2 Frank v. Siegel, 263 IMI.App. 316 (1931); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Broeker, 166 Ind.
576, 77 N.E. 1092 (i9o6); Lackey v. Yekel, 113 Neb. 382, 203 N.W. 542 (1925); cf. Bagley v.
Ill. Trust and Sav. Bank, 199 Ill. 76, 64 N.E. 1o85 (1902); Tuckerv. Nabo Construction Corp.,
ios N.J. Eq. 449, 155 Atl. 623 (1931); note: 4 A.L.R. 1415 (1919); 55 A.L.R. 1027 (1928); 87
A.L.R. 635 (1933).
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a genuine danger that his security will become inadequate and that in
this event his remedies on the debt will be inadequate, the court will not
ordinarily undertake the management of the property. But when such a
showing is made, the court does not hesitate to undertake the preservation of the security and will order the receiver to do all things reasonably
necessary to accomplish this purpose. Not only does the court through its
officer assume the normal incidents of management, but in exceptional
cases it may resort to more unusual expedients such as the continuance of
the mortgagor's business 3 or the issuance of receiver's certificates which
may displace the lien of the mortgage being foreclosed. 4 The court has
developed too, the theory that the property is in custodia legis and that
any unauthorized interference with the receivership either, directly, by
interfering with the receiver's possession, or, indirectly, by the institution
of actions or process relating to the property is a contempt of court 5s In
3 Cake v. Mohun, 164 U.S. 311 (r896); First National Bank of San Francisco v. Detroit
Trust Co., 248 Fed. i6 (C.C.A. 9th 1916) (consent); Pacific Northwest Packing Co. v. Allen,
iog Fed. 5z5 (C.C.A. 9th i9oi); Makeel v. Hotchkiss, 19o Ill. 31x, 6o N.E. 524 (i9oi) (consent); note: 14 St. Louis L. Rev. 315 (1929). An analogous problem is the power of the court
to appoint a receiver for property not included in the mortgage. It is generally stated that the
court has no "jurisdiction" to appoint a receiver of property not covered by the mortgage.
Scott v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 69 Fed. x7 (C.C.A. 8th 1895); Noyes v. Rich, 52 Maine,
115 (1862); Thomas v. Armstrong, 51 Okla. 203, isi Pac. 689 (1915); Whitley v. Challis,
[X892] I Ch. 64. The results of these cases are doubtless correct because the petitioners failed to
show that the preservation of their security necessitated control by the receiver of the unmortgaged property. Had such a showing been made, the denial of the receivership seems questionable. See Grant v. Leach & Co., 280 U.S. 351 (x93o), reversing Leach & Co. v. Grant 27 Fed.
(2d) 201 (C.C.A. 6th 1928); Sumsion v. Crutwell, 31 W.R. 399 (Ch. 1883); Campbell v. Lloyd's
Bank, 58 L.J. 424 (Ch. i889); County of Gloucester Bank v. Rudry Methyr Steam and House
Coal Colliery Co., [1895] i Ch. 629, 638; i Tardy's Smith on Receivers (2d ed. 1920), 577;
note 14 St. Louis L. Rev. 315 (1929). The fear that if a receiver is appointed, the unmortgaged
property will not be available for the other creditors of the mortgagor (see Thomas v. Armstrong, 51 Okla. 203, i5x Pac. 689 [1915]) seems groundless, since in the final account the priority of the mortgagee might be limited to that portion of the assets derived from the mortgaged
property.
4 Colorado Wool Marketing Assn. v. Monaghan, 66 F. (2d) 313 (C.C.A. ioth 1933); Feldman v. Am. Palestine Line, Inc., 15 F. (2d) 94, (D.C. N.Y. 1926); Title Insurance and Trust
Co. v. California Development Co., 171 Cal. 227, 152 Pac. 542 (X915); Lockport Felt Co. v.
United Box Board and Paper Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 686, 7o Atl. 98o (r9o8); Porch v. Agnew Co.,
57 Atl. 546 (N.J. Eq. 19o4); Lunsky v. Criterion Construction Co., isi Atl. 490 (N.J. Eq.
1930). The jurisdiction is exercised cautiously and the courts are reluctant to displace the
mortgagee's priority to obtain funds required to continue the business: Hanna v. State Trust
Co., 70 Fed. 2 (C.C.A. 8th 1895); Raht v. Attrill, io6 N.Y. 423, 13 N.E. 282 (1887); Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Greene and Sons Corp., 5o R.I. 305, 146 Atl. 765 (1929); see notes:
3x Col. L. Rev. 170 (I931); 7 Mich. L. Rev. 239 (1909); 79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 788 (I93r).
sWiswall v. Sampson, 14 How. (U.S.) 52 (1852); People v. Kowalski, 307 Ill. 378, 138 N.E.
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(1923);

Anderson v. Macek, 350 Ill. X35,

182

N.E. 745

(1804); 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4 th ed. I919),

(1933).

(1932);

§§

Angel v. Smith, 9 Ves. 335

1583-1590; 17 Minn. L. Rev. 56o
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short, the theory of the receivership is that it is a conservation measure
designed to protect the interests of all parties to the proceeding pending
the determination of the suit, and that it is the function of the receiver
acting under the instructions of the court to do those things reasonably
necessary to accomplish this fundamental end.
This, then, brings one to the immediate problem: what are the rights
and duties of receivers with respect to tenants of the mortgagor whose
leases are subordinate to the mortgage? If the terms of the mortgagor's
leases are as advantageous as those which the receiver could negotiate,
may he affirm them? If the terms are not substantially as good as he could
obtain may he repudiate them? Or, to state the problem from the point of
view of the tenants: what are the rights and duties of the tenants? If the
terms are advantageous, may the tenants enforce the leases against the
receiver? If the terms are burdensome may the tenants avoid the leases
upon the appointment of the receiver? The answer to these problems depends, it is submitted, upon the answer to a simple question: can the
mortgagee's margin of security be preserved adequately without avoiding
the mortgagor's leases? If the margin of security can be adequately preserved the tenants should not be disturbed, because a receivership should
not alter the status quo more than is necessary to accomplish this end.6
But when the margin of security cannot be preserved adequately if the
mortgagor's leases are continued, the court should direct the receiver to
repudiate them and negotiate new ones.
To apply this principle to a specific case, the court must determine
whether the rents and profits pending foreclosure as well as the corpus constitute a part of the mortgagee's security. If they do not, the receiver
should not avoid the mortgagor's leases even though the rents reserved
are much lower than the receiver might obtain for new leases. Unless the
possession of the tenants endangers the corpus, they should be permitted
to continue under their old leases. If, however, rents and profits pending
foreclosure constitute a portion of the mortgagee's security, the court
must determine whether the continuance of the mortgagor's leases will
render the mortgagee's margin of security inadequate. If it will, the receiver should be directed to avoid the mortgagor's leases. Approached
6In re Newdigate Colliery, Ltd.,

[1912] 1

Ch.468; In re Great Cobar, Ltd., [1915] 1 Ch.682;

Starner v. Nisbitt, 9 Ir. Eq. R. 96 (1846) (order for sale free from mortgagor's leases refused,
but referred to master to ascertain whether mortgagee's security was inadequate); Murtin v.
Walker, Sau. & Sc. 139 (Ir. Rolls 1837) (court refused to evict mortgagor's tenants because no
showing of inadequacy of mortgagee's security and doubts as to validity of the mortgage);
American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. N.Y. Railroad Co., 278 Fed. 842 (D.C.N.Y. 1922).
Cf. the rule of "sale in inverse order of alienation": 3 Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928), § 2084.
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from this point of view the results of the cases in which the question has
been raised seem reasonable.
RIGHT OF RECEIVER TO DISAFFIRM MORTGAGOR S LEASES

In "title" jurisdictions in which the mortgagee qua mortgagee is entitled to possession from and after default, rents and profits constitute a
part of his security and in those jurisdictions the courts order receivers to
disaffirm the mortgagor's leases in which the rent reserved is less than the
reasonable value of the premises if the continuation of those leases endangers the mortgagee's margin of security.7
In "lien" jurisdictions where the mortgagee qua mortgagee is not entitled
to possession and the rents and profits are not a part of the mortgagee's
security, the courts order receivers not to interfere with the mortgagor's
leases even though the rents reserved are less than the receiver might get
for new leases.' Conceivably in a "lien" jurisdiction though the mortgagee is not entitled to possession pending the suit, he may, by reason of a
pledge of rents or some theory of equitable lien, have some claim to rents
and profits pending foreclosure." The extent of this right depends upon
the statutes and decisions of the particular jurisdiction. The mortgagee
may be entitled to the occupational value of the premises during the suit or
his right may be limited to the rents which actually accrue under the mortgagor's leases during the suit. Whether in a "lien" jurisdiction, then, the
receiver may disaffirm the mortgagor's leases, depends upon the view
adopted as to the extent of the mortgagee's security. If the security includes the occupational value of the premises, the receiver may avoid.
those leases of the mortgagor the continuance of which will endanger the
mortgagee's margin of security;9 if it does not include rents and profits or
if it includes only those rents which in fact accrue under the mortgagor's
7Rohrer v. Deatherage, 336 Inl. 450, 168 N.E. 266 (1929); The Rankin-Whitham State
Bank v. Mulcahey, 344 Ill. 99, 176 N.E. 366 (1931); Henshaw Ward & Co. v. Wells, 9 Humph.
(Tenn.) 568 (1848); Lord Mansfield v. Hamilton, 2 Sch. & Lef. 28 (Ch. i8o4) (leases subordinate to mortgage apparently held unenforceable against the receiver). The cases permitting
receivers to avoid the mortgagor's arrangements for payment of rent in advance of the date it
is due may be supported on this ground. See Boteler v. Leber, 112 N.J. Eq. 441, 164 At. 572
(1933).
8Motor Finance Co. v. Wenzlaff, 197 Iowa 314, 197 N.W. 6o

Iowa 690,

202

(1924); Smith v. Cushatt, igg
N.W. 548 (1925); The Prudence Co. Inc. v. x6o W. 73rd St. Corp., 26o N.Y. 205,

183 N.E. 365 (1932); Grether v. Nick, 193 Wis. 503, 213 N.W. 304 (1927); Ottman v. Tilbury,
204 Wis. 56, 234 N.W. 325 (i932); Zimmerman v. Walgreen, 255 N.W. 534 (Wis. 1934).
8a Bank of Manhattan Trust Co. v. 571 Park Ave. Corp., 263 N.Y. 57, 188 N.E. 156 (i933).
9 State ex rel. Coker v. Dist. Court of Tulsa County,

159 Okla. io, 11P. (2d) 495 (1932).
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leases, the receiver is bound by those leases unless they can be impeached
as fraudulent or unless their continuance endangers the corpus of the
property.' 0
RIGHT TO AFFIRM MORTGAGOR'S LEASES

Normally the rent reserved in leases negotiated by the mortgagor before foreclosure will be higher than the receiver can obtain for new leases.
For not only will the foreclosure ordinarily be commenced when real
estate values are depressed, but the receiver's leases will of necessity be
forced transactions negotiated under most unfavorable circumstances."
Unless, therefore, the mortgagor's leases were executed under special drcumstances, as, for example, co-operative apartment leases or by a desperate or fraudulent mortgagor, the terms will be more favorable than the receiver can obtain. The receiver will usually, therefore, desire to affirm
rather than disaffirm the mortgagor's leases. The tenants, however, will
be anxious to repudiate them as improvident bargains. Since the purpose
of the receivership is to preserve the property which is the subject of the
suit, it would seem that the tenants should not be permitted to rely upon
the appointment of the receiver as a release from these undesirable leases.
And yet, strangely enough, the device developed by the court of chancery
as a conservation measure has been seized upon by tenants to justify a repudiation of unfavorable leases. In jurisdictions where the receiver is
bound by the mortgagor's leases their efforts have failed.- In jurisdictions
where the receiver may repudiate the mortgagor's leases the question has
seldom been considered.'1 The argument for the tenants in those jurisdictions is based upon two grounds: one, want of privity of estate between the
receiver and the tenants, and two, unfairness.

1O
The Prudence

Co. v. 16o W. 73rd St. Corp., 260 N.Y.

205,

183 N.E. 365

(1932).

1 For cases illustrating some of the difficulties, see Chicago Deposit Vault v. McNutla, 153
U.S. 554 (1894); Farmers Loan & Trust v. Eaton, 114 Fed. i4 (C.C.A. 8th 1902); Gooden v.
Vinke, 87 Ill.
App. 562 (1899); Chicago Land Bank v. McCambridge, 343 Ill.
456, 175 N.E. 834
('93'); Shreve v. Hankinson, 3 4 N.J. Eq. 413 (x88i); Weeks v. Weeks and Cornwell, io6 N.Y.
626, 13 N.E. 96 (1887).

-Loring M. Hewen Co. v. Malter, 26o N.Y.S. 624, 145 Misc. 635 (1932); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Childs Co., 230 N.Y. 285, i3o N.E. 295 (1921); Markantonis v. Madian Realty
Corp., 262 N.Y. 354, 186 N.E. 862 (1933); Knickerbocker Oil Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 254
N.Y.S. 5o6, 234 App. Div. 199 (1931); note, 33 Col. L. Rev. 1211 (1933); for an extreme case
see Lynch v. Harrer, 261 N.Y.S. 565, 146 Misc. 493 (1933).
X3 Cases commonly cited for this point are not in point. See, for example, Stephen v. Reibling, 45 Ill.
App. 40 (1892) in which the tenant did not, apparently, contest liability for rent.
It was recently considered by the New Jersey Chancery Court: Walgreen v. Moore, 173 Atl.
587 (N.J. 1934).
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WANT OF PRIVITY OF ESTATE

The tenants contend that the position of the receiver is substantially
that of a mortgagee in possession; thai a mortgagee in possession cannot
for want of privity of estate enforce the leases of his mortgagor 4 and that,
therefore, upon the- appointment of a receiver, the mortgagor's tenants
may repudiate their leases. The premise that the receiver occupies the position of a mortgagee in possession is supported, the tenants contend, by
the facts that the receiver is not bound by the mortgagor's leases, that he
is appointed upon the motion of the mortgagee, and that the funds collected by the receiver are applied to satisfy the mortgagee's claims.
In considering this argument several points should be noted. In the
first place, the assumption that the receiver can avoid the mortgagor's
leases because his position is substantially that of a mortgagee in possession is not consistent with the fundamental nature of receiverships in foreclosure cases. As has already been developed,Che receiver is an officer of
the court appointed to conserve the mortgagee's security until the determination of the foreclosure proceedings. 5 He is the representative not of
the mortgagee but of all parties to the suit. His rights are not dependent
upon the title of the mortgagee. He is not chosen by the mortgagee. He is
not subject to the control of the mortgagee. The mortgagee is not liable
for his defaults. 6 A right of the mortgagee to possession either qua mortgagee or by express agreement will not per se induce the chancellor to appoint a receiver. Even though the mortgagee's right to possession is unconditional and his security is inadequate a receiver will not be appointed
if the mortgagor furnishes security which is satisfactory to the court. 8
Moreover, a receiver is appointed in many cases in which the mortgagee is
not entitled to possession. A receivership is just as common in a "lien"
X43 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920), 2447.

is See Central Trust Co. v. Worcester Cycle Co., 93 Fed. 712 (C.C.A. 2d 1899), Io Fed. 491
(C.C.A. Mass. igoi), I14 Fed. 66o (C.C.A. X902); and 24HalsburyLaws of England, Receivers
(1912), § 722, p. 384.
16Rigge v. Bowater, 3 Bro. C. C. 365 (i79); Hutchinson v. Massareene, 2 Ball & B. 49, 55
(i81i); Ingham v. Sutherland, 63 L. T. 614 (Ch. 18go); Robinson v. Arkansas Loan and Trust
Co., 74 Ark. 292, 85 S.W. 413 (i905); Kaiser v. Kellar, 21 Iowa 95 (1866); Farmers Loan and
Trust Co. v. Oregon Pac. Rd., 31 Ore. 237, 48 Pac. 706 (1897). Cf. Sorchan v. Mayo, 5o NJ.
Eq. 288, 23 At. 479 (1892). See 3 Jones, Mortgages (8th ed. 1928), § 1954. For the analogous
problem as to liability for expenses of receivership, see notes: 68 A.L.R. 878 (1930), 21 Col. L.
Rev. 466 (1921), 21 Harv. L. Rev. 529 (i9o8).
17 Supra note 2.

X8Tardy's Smith on Receivers (1920), §§ i5, 25, 240; i Wiltsie, Foreclosure of Mortgages
( 4 th ed. 1927), § 564. See Ill. Statutes, Smith-Hurd (1933), c. 22:55.
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jurisdiction such as New York as it is in "title" jurisdictions. 9 A receiver
is frequently appointed after a foreclosure sale, although the mortgagee's
right to possession is terminated by the sale.20
If the appointment of the receiver were really the equivalent of the
entry by the mortgagee into possession, the right of tenants to terminate
their leases upon the appointment of a receiver would almost certainly
have appeared in the English cases where doctrines of privity are applied
with great strictness.1 Under the traditional English and Irish practice,

however, the mortgagor's tenants are required, as a matter of course, to
attorn to the receiver and, if they refuse, are committed for contempt of
court.- If it is necessary to distrain for rent before attornment the court
orders the receiver to proceed in the name of the mortgagor. 23 Likewise,
even before attornment the receiver may take advantage of statutes designed to protect landlords. 4 Furthermore, there is considerable authority in both England and America to the effect that the receiver is entitled
to arrears of rent which, though accruing before his appointment, had not
been collected by the mortgagor prior to the receivership.2s
The fact that the fund collected by the receiver is usually awarded to
the mortgagee who institutes the receivership does not justify the conclusion that the receiver's position is substantially that of a mortgagee in
possession. In "lien" jurisdictions, such as New York, in which the mortgagee has no right to possession, the surplus collected by the receiver is
awarded to the mortgagee to satisfy the deficiency remaining due after the
foreclosure sale, just as in the jurisdictions in which the mortgagee is en'9 See, for example, Hollenbeck v. Donnell, 94 N.Y. 342 (1884), and Post v. Dorr, 4 Edw.

Ch. (N.Y.) 412 (X844).
20

Haas v. Chicago Bldg. Society, 89 Ill. 498 (1878); O'Brian v. Fry, 82 Ill. 274 (1876).

21

See Dunlop v. Selfridge, [i915] A.C. 847; Pound, Spirit of the Common Law (1921), 22

el seq.
- Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 2 Swanst. io8 (Ch. 1818); Seton, Decrees (2d ed. 1854),
539; 2 Daniell, Chancery Practice (6th Am. ed. 1894), * 1741.
3 Pitt v. Snowden, 3 Atk. 750 (1752); Hughes v. Hughes, i Ves. i6i (179o); Seton, Decrees
(2d ed. 1854), 540; Fisher and Lightwood, Mortgages (7 th ed. 1931), 371.
'4 Cox v. Harper, [19io] i Ch. 480 in which without attomment receiver was held to be a

"landlord" of mortgagor's tenant for the purposes of Landlord and Tenant Act (17o9) and
therefore entitled to demand rent in arrears from execution creditor of mortgagor.
2s Codrington v. Johnstone, i Beav. 520 (1838); Russell v. Russell, 2 Ir. Ch. R. 574 (1853);
Lofsky v. Maujer, 3 Sand. Ch. (N.Y.) 69 (1845); note, 33 Col. L. Rev. 1211 (1933); contra:
Steward v. Fairchild-Baldwin, 91 N.J. Eq. 86, io8 Atl. 30r (i919); cf. St. Louis Union Trust
Co. v. Wabash, C. & W. R. Co., 258 I1. App. 9 (i93o); Paramount Bldg. & Loan Assn. v.
Sacks, 107 N.J. Eq. 328, 152 At. 457 (1930).
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titled to possession.26 Yet in New York the receiver cannot be in any sense
a mortgagee in possession, since first, mortgagees are not entitled to pos7
session and secondly, the receiver is bound by the mortgagor's leases.2
The fact that the mortgagee is awarded the fund shows not that the receiver occupies substantially the position of a mortgagee in possession, but
rather that the surplus in question is a portion of the security available
for the satisfaction of the mortgagee's claim. The fund is awarded ultimately to the mortgagee not because it has been collected by his representative, the receiver, but because the fund is a portion of the security
pledged by the mortgagor, and the proceeds of the sale have been insufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt. The appointment of the receiver,
however, is not an adjudication that the mortgagee's security includes
rents and profits, and it is not equivalent to an award to the mortgagee of
the fund to be collected by the receiver. The distribution of the fund is
not determined until the termination of the litigation.25 It will be awarded
to a mortgagee only if the court determines that rents and profits, pending
foreclosure, are a portion of the mortgagee's security. If, as is the rule in a
number of jurisdictions, the court concludes that rents and profits are in
no sense security for satisfaction of the mortgage debt, the fund will be
awarded not to a mortgagee but to the holder of the equity of redemption. 29 Even though rents and profits are, in the jurisdiction, a portion of
the mortgagee's security, the fund will not be given to the mortgagee who
instituted the receivership, unless he establishes that his mortgage is superior to that of other parties to the litigation, and that the suit has resulted in a sale leaving a deficiency. 30 If his mortgage has been satisfied,
or if he dismisses his suit, or if he obtains a decree of strict foreclosure he
is not entitled to any of the fund.3 ' The fact that he instituted the receivership does not give him any priority over other parties to the litiga26

Post v. Dorr, 4 Edw. Ch. (N.Y.)

27

Supra note 8.
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(T847); Astor v. Turner, ii Paige (N.Y.) 436 (1845).

, 8 New Jersey Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Cone & Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 45, 53 AtI. 97
(1902); Last v. Winkel, 86 N.J. Eq. 356; 97 Adt. 961 (i916); i Wiltsie, Foreclosure of Mortgages (4th ed. 1927), § 6o6.
29 Elmira Mechanics Society v. Stanchfield, i6o Fed. 8ii (C.C.A. 8th igoS); Wagar v.
Stone, 36 Mich. 364 (1877); Marshall TIsley Bank v. Cody, 76 Minn. 112, 78 N.W. 978 (1899);
First National Bank of Aberdeen v. Cranmer, 42 S.D. 404, 175 N.W. 88i (1920); Gerber v.
Heath, 92 Wash. 519, 159 Pac. 691 (igi6).
3o Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 163 Atl. 254 (1932); Cross v. The Will County National Bank, 177 Ill. 33, 52 N.E. 322 (i898); note, however, terms of order of appointment.
31Desiderio v. Iadonisi,!ius Conn. 652, z63 Adt. 254 (1932); Corcoran v. Witz, 252 In. App.

473 (1929).
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tion, since the receiver acts in the interests of all parties to the litigation as
their titles are ultimately determined by the court. 32 To this rule there is
but one exception, namely, that the institution of the receivership may
give a junior lienholder a better claim to rents and profits collected by the
receiver than a senior lienholder who fails promptly to intervene in the
receivership. The senior lienholder, even though he later intervenes, obtains no claim to that portion of the rents and profits collected by the receiver prior to the intervention. 33 The reason for this advantage is not
that the receiver is the representative of the petitioning mortgagee-he
cannot be because other parties to the receivership including the mortgagor may share in the fund-but rather because a mortgagee who has
done nothing to preserve the security should not be in a better position
than he would have been had the mortgagor continued in possession.
Even this advantage is denied the petitioning mortgagee in some jurisdictions in which the fund is distributed among parties to the suit and inter4
veners in order of the priority of their securities.3
It would seem, then, that even though the receiver may avoid the mortgagor's leases and even though the fund that he accumulates is normally
applied on the mortgage debt the position of the receiver is not substantially that of a mortgagee in possession and that therefore the decisions
that a mortgagee in possession cannot affirm the mortgagor's leases are
not applicable to receiverships.
Even were the analogy closer, the rule that a mortgagee in possession
cannot affirm the mortgagor's leases should not be extended beyond the
limits required by the doctrine of stare decisis and should not be applied to
receivership cases. The expediency of the rule of want of privity as applied to mortgage cases is most questionable. Though it may not be desirable to permit strangers coming in under a paramount title to affirm the
leases of tenants who chance to be in possession of land, the position of the
mortgagee is quite different. Though the mortgagee is entitled to possession, the mortgagor continues to have a substantial interest in the premises.
If the tenants are permitted to repudiate their leases, the burden will fall
not merely upon the mortgagee but upon the mortgagor or his assignees.
It should be noted that the want of privity doctrine was extended to the
mortgage cases only after a great struggle and in the face of a line of cases
holding that the mortgagee might by giving notice affirm the mortgagor's
32 Cross v. The Will County National Bank, x77 Ill. 33, 52 N.E. 322 (1898); New York Title
Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Cone & Co., 64 N.J. Eq. 45, 53 At. 97 (1902).

33Bermes v. Kelley, io8 N.J. Eq. 289, 154 At. 86o '(i931).
34

Bergin v. Robbins, io 9 Conn. 329, 146 At. 724

(1929).
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leases. 3 This extension of the rule might have been justified as an extreme measure for the protection of the mortgagor by inducing the mortgagee not to assert his legal right to possession. This reason is not applicable to the receivership cases, since the mortgagor is amply protected by
the rules restricting the appointment of receivers and, as we have seen,
the rule has not yet been extended to them. In England the rule has all
but been abolished by statute.36 In view of the disastrous consequences of
the application of the rule to the mortgagor and his assignees and, in view
of the increased difficulties of management, which the rule will thrust upon
the courts if it is extended to the receivership cases, the desirability of
limiting the doctrine rather than extending it seems obvious. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the New Jersey Chancery Court recently rejected a tenant's plea based upon this theory and described it as "both
7
novel and startling."'
It would seem, then, even though a receiver is not bound by the mortgagor's leases and even though the mortgagee may ultimately get the
fund collected by the receiver, that the tenants' first argument to justify
their repudiation-want of privity-is unsound.
UNFAIRNESS

The second argument of the tenants is that upon equitable principles of
fairness if the receiver may repudiate the mortgagor's leases, the tenants
should have a corresponding privilege. As Mr. justice Crouch stated the
argument in his dissenting opinion in Holmes v. Gravenhorst:'8
I "The actual basis of the decision in the Prudence Company case, as it seems to me,

was not the stern logic of the doctrine of possession, but rather the equitable consideration that the asserted right of the receiver to get occupational rent, when that was
higher than the reserved rent, was not paralleled by reciprocal right in the

tenant to

pay only occupational rent when that was lower than the reserved rent."

The question is whether to permit the receiver and not the tenants to
affirm or disaffirm the leases is so inequitable that the chancellor should not
be a party to it. The experience of chancery with the notion that equality
is equity and its application in the want of mutuality cases has been so un"Pope v. Biggs, 9 B.& C. 245 (K.B. 1829); Waddilove v. Barnett, 4 Dowl. 347 (K.B. 1835);
Brown v. Storey, i Man. & G. 1i7 (Co. Pls. 184o); Underhay v. Read, 2o Q.B.D. 209 (1887);
cf. Evans v. Elliot, 9 Ad. & El. 342 (K.B. 1838); Towerson v. Jackson, [I891] 2 Q.B. 484.
i Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (1912), § 73a (6).
36 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, § i8 now replaced by i Geo. V. c. 20, § 99.
37 Walgreen v. Moore, 173 Atl. 587 (N.J. 1934).
38 Holmes v. Gravenhorst, 263 N.Y. 148, i57, 188 N.E. 285, 288 (1933).
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fortunate that one should be extremely skeptical of suggestions for its
extension. 39 Its application to this case seems peculiarly inappropriate.
,If the tenant's plea is allowed, the purposes of the receivership will be
very largely frustrated. Assets will be dissipated rather than preserved
4°
and the task of administration will be rendered much more difficult. It
will result in loss not merely to mortgagees but in every case to the mortgagor and assignees of the mortgagor. 4' At first thought this economic
waste with the inevitable hardship imposed upon those least able to bear
it might seem justified as the price of rescuing the tenant from an intolerable position. But if one considers the tenant's position carefully, one
finds that it is not particularly harsh. In the first place, the receiver's
privilege of rejecting the mortgagor's leases must be exercised promptly
upon his appointment. 42 He is, of course, allowed a sufficient period within
which to form an intelligent opinion of the merits of the lease, but once
that period has elapsed the receiver's privilege of rejecting the lease is lost
and thereafter the lease is as binding upon the receiver as one which he has
negotiated personally. Even though the receiver rejects the lease promptly upon his appointment the tenant cannot be compelled to continue to
pay rent upon any basis other than the terms of his old lease. If he and
the receiver cannot come to terms, he may vacate the premises and avoid
future liability for the premises.43 On the other hand, if the receiver fails
to reject the lease promptly the tenant continues to enjoy the premises
strictly in accord with the terms of his bargain with the mortgagor.
Secondly, the position of the tenant is the consequence of a risk which
he voluntarily assumed when he took the lease. In some cases the lease is
by its very terms expressly subordinate to the mortgage. The tenant
knew that his right to occupy the premises under the lease was contingent
upon satisfaction of the mortgage and with this knowledge he entered into
the premises. If the lease is not in terms subordinate to the mortgage the
39Ames, Lectures on Legal History (1913), 370 elseq.; Lewis, Present Status of the Defence

of Want of Mutuality in Specific Performance, 51 Am. Law Reg. (O.S.) 591 (193); Pomeroy,
Specific Performance of Contracts in Illinois, i Ill. Law Bul. i17, 128 (1918).
40 For an extreme statement of this point see Walgreen v. Moore, 173 Ati. 587 (N.J. i934).
4zThe mortgagor will be damaged not only because he loses a valuable lease, but also because he will be liable for breach of covenant to the tenant who is evicted. Mack v. Patchin, 42
N.Y. 167 (1870); Ganz v. Clark, 252 N.Y. 92, 169 N.E. 1oo (i929); B. F. Avery & Sons v.
Kennerly, 12 S.W. (2d) i4o (Tex. 1929).
42 Central

Republic Trust Co. v. 33 South Wabash Bldg. Corp., 273 Ill.
App. 380 (1934).

Sager v. Rebdor Realty Corp., 230 App. Div. io6, 243 N.Y. Supp. 314 (1930); MonroKing & Gremmels Realty Corp. v. 9 Avenue-31 Street Corp., 233 App. Div. 4oi, 253 N.Y.
Supp. 303 (1931).
43
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predicament of the tenant is the result of his willingness to take a lease
without investigating the lessor's title. Had he examined the title he
would have discovered the incumbrance. If he did not care to examine the
title, he might easily have protected himself by insisting upon a lease in
which a breach of a covenant against incumbrances was made a ground for
termination of the lease. Since he did not take these precautions, he
should not be heard to say that he did not assume the risk of possible defects in his lessor's title, and should not be granted relief from his bargain.
The real basis of the tenant's plea is that he has taken a lease which has
proved unprofitable. Real estate values have gone down and not up, and
consequently the tenant seizes upon the cry of hardship and the technical
plea of want of privity to avoid the consequences of his error in judgment.
It is not, therefore, surprising to find that the cases indicate that the
plea of the tenant will be rejected by the courts. Though there does not
seem to be any clear-cut decision on the question, English and Irish cases
and the opinions of English commentators point to this conclusion. 44 In
accord are the decisions in analogous types of cases. First is the wellknown rule that a tenant in possession of the premises cannot, unless he
can establish a breach of covenant, which is an express condition precedent; avoid his lease because of a defect in his landlord's title, even though
this defect is one which may at any time be asserted against him.4" In
these cases the stranger may obtain the privilege of affirming or disaffirming by obtaining an assignment from the lessor. then there is the wellestablished rule allowing the receiver of a corporation or the trustee in
bankruptcy a reasonable period within which to determine whether to
adopt or reject leases of the insolvent corporation or bankrupt.46 Also inconsistent with the tenant's plea is the rule developed in foreclosure cases
in New York and other lien jurisdictions permitting the mortgagee to
elect to adopt or disaffirm the mortgagor's leases. If the mortgagee desires to adopt the mortgagor's lease, he does not join the tenant in the
foreclosure proceedings and does not obtain a decree of foreclosure against
the tenant. The purchaser at the sale, who is usually a mortgagee, may
enforce the lease as the assignee of the reversion. 47 If, however, the mort44 Supra notes

22, 23,

24 and 25. See also Walgreen v. Moore, 173 At. 587 (N.J. 1934).

4s Bigelow, Estoppel (6th ed. 1913), 547 etseq.; i Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant (1912), § 78.
46 Clark, Foley, and Shaw, Adoption and Rejection of Contracts and Leases by Receivers,
46 Harv. L. Rev. 1111 (1933); note, 31 Col. L. Rev. 297 (i93i).
47 Dundee Naval Stores v. McDowell, 65 Fla. i5, 6i So. io8 (1913); Commonwealth Mortgage Co. v. De Waltoff, 135 App. Div. (N.Y.) 33 (igog); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.
Childs Co., 230 N.Y. 285, 13o N.E. 295 (1921); Markantonis v. Madlan Realty Corp., 262
N.Y. 354, 186 N.E. 862 (i933); Ex parte Owens, Ioo S.C. 324, 84 S.E. 875 (i9r5).
Contra: McDermott v. Burke, i6 Cal. 58o (i86o) (dictum since lessee took his lease after
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gagee desires to avoid the mortgagor's lease, he makes the tenant a party
to the suit and obtains a decree of foreclosure against him. Then as purchaser at the sale the mortgagee may evict the tenant. This rule Mr. Justice Crouch apparently overlooked in his explanation of the Prudence
case. This privilege of the mortgagee shows, it is submitted, that the New
York rule that the receiver is bound by the mortgagor's leases is to be
justified on the ground that in New York the mortgagee's security is limited to the rents which actually accrue under the mortgagor's leases and
not upon the ground of preventing hardship to the tenant.
Likewise inconsistent with the tenant's plea is the rule that a mortgagee
may, by obtaining the co-operation of the mortgagor, have the privilege of
adopting or rejecting the mortgagor's leases. As assignee of the reversion
he will be entitled to the privileges of a landlord;45 as mortgagee he will not
be bound by them. In view of these well established lines of decisions it
seems that the courts will not be persuaded by the tenant's plea of fairness.
In summary, then, the solution of the problems of the essay seems simple: the receiver may, and in the typical case should adopt the mortgagor's leases. Only in the exceptional case in which the continuance of
these leases endangers the mortgagee's security may he reject them. On the
other hand, neither the appointment of the receiver nor the privilege of the
receiver to reject the mortgagor's leases gives the tenants the right to repudiate their leases.
the suit was instituted and was therefore bound by the decree under the doctrine of lis
pendens);
Downard v. Graff, 40 Iowa 597 (1875), (but cf. First Trust Joint Stock Land Bank of Chicago
v. Ingels, 251 N.W. 630 (Iowa, 1934) ); Dolese v. Bellows-Claude Neon Co., 26z Mich. 57, 245
N.W. 569 (1932). For a criticism of this line of cases see 3 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920),
2700 el seq.; note 32 Mich. L. Rev. 1i9 (i933).
In a "title" jurisdiction even though the lessee has not been foreclosed, the purchaser at the
sale should not be bound by these leases since he succeeds to the rights of the mortgage. Cf.
however, Ellveeay Newspaper Assn. v. Wagner Market Co., iio NIJ.L. 577, 166 Atl. 332
(1932) (dictum). The court may, however, when the mortgagee will not be prejudiced, order a
sale subject to the lease; in such case the purchaser is, of course, bound by the lease. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown and Randolph Co., 154 Ga. 229, 114 S.E. 36 (1932).
For a discussion of the problem see, notes: 14 A.L.R. 664 (1921); Ann. Cases 19i5A 397
(1915); 42 Harv. L. Rev. 280 (1928); 13 Col. L. Rev. 553 (1913).
48 Chicago City Bank and Trust Co. v. Walgreen Co., 272 l.App. 434 (I933); International
Paper Co. v. Priscilla Co., 281 Mass. 22, 183 N.E. 58 (1932).

